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Abstract
In this note, we argue that there is a bug in [Tirole, J., “Hierarchies and bureau-
cracies: On the role of collusion in organizations,” Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, vol.2, 181-214, 1986].
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In this note, the notation is referred to Ref. [1]. Vertical structures are rep-
resented by three-layer hierarchies: principal/supervisor/agent. The principal,
who is the owner of the vertical structure or the buyer of the good produced by
the agent, or more generally, the person who is affected by the agent’s activity,
lacks either the time or the knowledge required to supervise the agent. The
supervisor is a party that exerts no effort, receives a wage from the principal
and collects information to help the principal control the agent. The agent is
the productive unit. The profit x created by the agent’s activity depends on
a productivity parameter θ and on the effort e > 0 he exerts:
x = θ + e.
The agent’s effort e is assumed not observable by the supervisor and the
principal. The agent’s disutility of effort is equal, in monetary terms, to g(e).
For a given θ, the supervisor’s signal s can take two values: {θ,∅}, where ∅
denotes observation “nothing”. The report r of supervisor is verifiable, i.e.,
if s = θ then r ∈ {θ,∅}, otherwise r = ∅. The productivity θ can take two
values: θ and θ¯ such that 0 < θ < θ¯. There are four states of nature, indexed by
i. State of nature i has probability pi (
4∑
i=1
pi = 1). The agent always observes
θ before choosing his effort. The supervisor may or may not observe θ. In the
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following description of the four states of nature, S and A stand for supervisor
and agent:
State 1 : A and S observe θ.
State 2 : A observes θ, S observes “nothing”.
State 3 : A observes θ¯, S observes “nothing”.
State 4 : A and S observe θ¯.
Claim 1: The supervisor and principal cannot discriminate State 2 and 3.
Proof : The only difference between State 2 and 3 is that agent A observes
different values of productivity. However, this parameter is agent’s private
information and not observable to the supervisor and principal. Put in other
words, State 2 and 3 are indifferent to the supervisor and the principal. 
Timing.
1) The principal offers a contract.
2) A learns the productivity θ, S learns the signal s.
3) A chooses the effort e.
4) Profit x = θ + e, S reports r.
5) The principal transfers S(x, r) and W (x, r) to the supervisor and agent
respectively.
Claim 2: There is a bug in the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint
(AIC ): W3 − g(e3) ≥W2 − g(e2 −△θ) (Page 191, Line 8, [1]).
Proof : As specified in the timing, the wage W (x, r) of agent is transferred
by the principal. It only depends on the commonly observable variables x
and r, not on the agent’s private productivity θ. Since the principal cannot
discriminate State 2 and 3, the items W2 and W3 are indeed meaningless.
That’s the bug, not only for the condition (AIC ), but also for the whole paper
of Tirole (1986).
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